>> MODERATOR: We are looking at freedom of expression and another one looking at freedom of religious expression, and eventually the workshop was merged into one, and we have talk about not only from the religious perspective. Very important research. Some of it has already been done. We talk about that research also. So why we expand when this was organized, is our region has amazing diversity.

I was on an earlier panel, and in the panel the speaker shared that Macao earns 33 billion US dollars per year. And I was thinking that 43 billion US dollars from gaming industry. If you talk about it in Pakistan, it's impossible. The gaming in Pakistan, or in most of the Islamic countries, you can't even think about it. But it's such a huge economic activity here.

Similarly, we have some of the very developed nations and some diversity in terms of culture, in terms of social, and then (?) and so this context of the larger Internet Governance is also connecting the next billion, talking about more and more
people that should come online and the opportunities that the potential is provided by the technology and the Internet.

In the same context, we also know the kind of challenges and the problems we're beginning to see. Ranging from, for example, bloggers being hacked in Bangladesh, and attacks on journalists in Pakistan and policy challenges in Malaysia or Indonesia. There is a whole range of different issues which we are faced with and wanting to have this discussion to discuss with you. Essentially we'll talk about some of the trends and the challenges for us and then we would want your input towards some recommendations and some possibilities how we can do something about this.

So, first of all, a round of introductions. My name is Shahzad Ahmad. I run Bytes For All in Pakistan. Then we would come to the participants. So starting with you.

>> PIRONGRONG RAMASOOTA: My name is Pirongrong Ramasoota. I'm with the Association for Communications Arts at Chulalongkorn University.

>> BISHAKHA DATTA: I am Bishakha Datta, Civil Society. IC policy and Internet Governance in the Philippines.

>> I'm from EngageMedia in Boston.

>> Most of my work is on freedom of expression.

>> MODERATOR: So not too many in the room so that we can hear from the audience members.

>> AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off microphone)

>> MODERATOR: So we keep it very informal. First, we are going to request to give us recently only outlook. We have requested to talk about the process and introduce and if you have some questions, we can open the floor for the session. Feel free to give us your recommendations and essentially all of this has to go to the outcome document.

Let's start with you.

>> We're looking at individual threats against Civil Society groups. We are also looking at technical measurements of information controls and threats to freedom of expression. And we started to do work on controls and corporate transparency. We are looking at information technology such as (?) and also surveillance.

So I want to talk specifically about our recent report called Communities At Risk, which document threats against Civil Society groups. This is one of the groups in the participating study. Technology is where it's a IGF in this study we had. The purpose is to obtain visibility into the digital environment and the Civil Society groups.

A quick summary, in our research we found that Civil Society have the same threats as the banks and the governments,
but they have far fewer resources to deal with these attacks. (?) then send me an e-mail with a question that has the malware. They are persistent. They will adapt over time over different platforms, and they extend beyond borders, the impact communications.

So we have seen at least three distinct models that characterize the capacities. They have the resources and capabilities to develop their own customized malware, also known as advance persistent threats. It's repurpose and it's on basic minimal aspect that you can purchase online. You have seen the case with Syria, and then also we have the commercial spyware; so while it does not have the capacity to operate the tasks, companies like Fisher, which is an Italian company, and we'll talk some more tomorrow.

So these are the kind of things that we have seen targeting Civil Society groups in government. APT 1 is reported 141 organizations, Net Traveler targeted 350 nongovernmental organizations, government and industry, and DTL reported by Fire Eye and targeted government industries. We call it the Target Threat Index. That's where we look at both the social sophistication. So this is an example of how we would categorize an attack.

This is the technical sophistication multiplier. No protection, to just multiple advanced protection techniques. This is an example of how we categorized it so far referring to our target of threat index.

Like I said, we have the session tomorrow dedicated to surveillance. So we will talk about issues of the mechanisms and the different tools that we have seen out there that are being used to target Civil Society groups. I'll go through them really quickly.

This is an event where it is open to government and law enforcement agencies where they can come there and purchase these tools and systems for surveillance. And this is one of the examples of tools that are used. So this is Fisher. You can see -- Fin Fisher. And this is the features that they list. So they're able to do monitoring, live surveillance and so forth.

This is another company called Hacking Team. This is the encryption. This is an example of an e-mail that has been infected using (?) targeting (?) and this is from our report that shows the global. And if you want to read more on our target threat of Civil Society groups, you can read the report. We also have a designated URL for all the reports of targeted threats that you can see there and at our website.

Thank you.

>> MODERATOR: Essentially we see how there is commercial
software is being used and how governments are targeting different communities, and doing ongoing research and looking at the whole literally what kind of impacts are impacted by journalists when it comes to freedom of expression. I'll request Andrew to talk about your research and your earlier.

>> So as I said, I work for an organization called EngageMedia. What I'll do, probably, I've got seven minutes each; is that right? Five to seven. It will probably be a little bit anecdotal in terms of our direct experience of how this space evolved over the last few years we have been working in it. So just as a form of an introduction, EngageMedia worked with human rights and environmental rights activists to assist them to generate greater impact for their work and how they can enable -- how they can make use of the technology and the media tools.

Democracy activists in Burma might be in Indonesia and DQ activists in Java. Lots of different places we work in the Philippines and Burma, focusing on video and video online. Specifically we developed essentially to assist people, make use of those technologies, as I mentioned, specifically using them online.

Freedom of expression program, but then increasingly particularly the last two or three years, but really has really amplified the issue around how do we -- we really begin to feel we were bringing people into this gilded cage where the promise of the Internet was the amazing tool of freedom of expression, the things you can do, train you on video and other technologies. The Internet is this independent system for distributing your content, has really become a little bit of a hollow -- our words increasingly felt hollow as we had to do this work because of the security threats, essentially, that people were facing as we brought them into that technology space.

What that meant for us, the threats that they were under, and then the chilling effects. Interestingly, sometimes there aren't as much chilling effects as you would expect. And I think kind of exploring the various cultural reasons for that is incredibly interesting. In one sense, it's kind of a resistance or maybe an intentional resistance to the surveillance. And I think it's very much a lack of awareness and people continue.

So I think what is going on, I think it's still to be determined and why we're looking at the research initiatives and interested in how the research people are doing as well to think about what impacts are perceived and actual surveillance and security threats.

All of that will line up in terms of how we work with various people and how that is essentially transformed as a
result of these kind of tools that we are using. We very much attempt to enable everyone is intersecting with a network that in my mind is increasingly corrupt in the sense of it's surveillance. It's essentially the business model with data mining and the tracking of behavior and your likes and your interests, etc., in order to target advertising.

I think how that the expression -- we're not really seeing that chilling effect, as I was saying, and in the sense that we will find we're dealing with people in Indonesia, and we were having this discussion before, it's a huge amount of convincing that's required to even have people acknowledge that there is a potential threat or why you might want to circumscribe that behavior, and through the modeling you can say doing it works, because you're ensure people that actually encourage people to hold back. It's almost like a process we need to go through to come out the other side, ideally.

What that process is, I think, for us is still very much to be determined because I think there's still important research. I think this great work with Citizen Lab and how is it doing in the region. But I think given just the complexity and the size, really the kind of avalanche of where the space is going, given that to my mind the models in China and the U.S. surveillance regimes are bowing down to the space as well. I think resisting those models, is incredibly complicated. I don't have a lot of easy answers in terms of where that space is going. I'm very much interested to hear how the people keeping the freedom of expression activists more broadly safe in that space looks like.

I think to my mind the huge amount of it might require more cultural activism rather than a direct -- as a precursor in order to get people interested in the digital security aspect. And I think this space is kind of different in that regard to say the U.S. and the European space where the public at large, probably in particular the regulations, is much broader. I'm very interested what that looks like, and what kind of security training that needs to happen in more detail. What are the resources? And I actually prefaced that with the work that we're doing, tending to do training around video. Essentially now very strong security aspects precisely because we cannot teach people these tools without simultaneously bringing this other aspect, which slows us down in some respects, but is becoming increasingly inevitable in the aspect of what we're doing.

I'm interested in alternative technologies and what that might look like, and what that would be look like generating out of this region, not being so reliant on the U.S. assistance and technologies. So more questions than answers. Something that's very much beginning and focusing on Indonesia, so people with
specific knowledge there, we very much would like to talk to you; that would be with Citizen Lab, essentially to understand those perceived and actual threats and what the repercussions are of the security practices and activities and any changes. So that's what we are doing.

>> MODERATOR: Thank you. A round of applause? Thank you. (Applause)

>> MODERATOR: So there are other issues -- are we -- several different organizations in Indonesia, they organized a major event actually. It all started last year when we sought after some research around the general issues and the possibility towards different communities and becoming much more difficult when it comes to freedom of expression, many religious issues, religious freedom issues. We wanted to look at expression in the context of religious. So that was very largest from all the region when that first came. So the event was -- we asked Bishakha about the process, and then we open to the questions for the first time for questions and then we can go into the others.

>> This is a really interesting event that happened early in June. There was about 2.5 days of very, very intensive discussions about freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Then these two things intersect. Some of the -- and there was some really wonderful excerpts that came and to input into the conversations. It was very good conceptual, and especially around the lines of the speech.

We also had Agnes Calamar, she has done a lost research in this area as well. And that this completely includes the right to offend. So states have no business in protecting us from being offended, but we definitely have an obligation to protect us from harm. It was really a nice piece of the conversation.

So what did we talk about? Too many things, and I will try to summarize. We did talk about many, many things. It was quite fantastic. We had conversations about conceptual differences, discrimination, and acceptance speech and how do you actually have different -- it's nice -- how this experience in different communities in the region. We really got a sense of how religious extremism has a different sound, taste, and color in different colors, even within Southeast Asia and Asia itself. I think that was very, very interesting.

Context really doesn't matter. We talked about interaction and how there were standards and how we actually apply these standards, and what was especially interesting for me is highlighting the free speech, especially when it revolves around religious expression, because that is often to the nation building project. It is often to how a particular agenda or particular society. It was very interesting to see interlaced
between all three of them.

So on the last day, after two days of conversations and inputs and more conversations, the drafting team made out of people of the organizing -- from the main organizers, global partners, Internet project.

(Off microphone)

>> So on last date, 2.5 days, so night two nobody slept. Everybody hung out. You know how that happens. Sat down and actually wrote down a self-pitched, and it was too long. Another drafting committee, the original drafting committee was tasked to do two things. We didn't want to lose the richness of all the recommendations and suggestions that came out of the conversations. But it really very much was an outcome document. So one was to draft the 12 page into more like a list of recommended actions and so forth, and then another was much more of outcomes document.

And this outline recommendations with three stakeholders. One was governance and included things like -- I'm sorry -- the recommendations of regional trends, which were interesting, including making clear the links between states and religion; so between political parties and religious movements and what's happening in the region. Also, about how expression of sexual and gender identity is related to protect religious.

The recommendations to states and governments, including reform, so things that are included recommendations to repeal any laws around defamation or insulting religion or blasphemy, including to protect and promote artistic, cultural, and intellectual expression, and then also recommendations to the judiciary and legal community as far as its national and regional bodies, including looking at the intersection between religious freedom and freedom of express. I encourage you to look at those recommendations.

>> MODERATOR: Thank you. So what happened after? We went to the next council and special rapporteur, and also to share over here, but then we also have a workshop lined up. What everybody decided was for the moment we have mapping of nine countries in the region, expand it, and then we wanted to have much more detailed research on this. We wanted to get this research to Brazil for the global IGF and then we'll see how we can take it to the UN Council or other possible policy bodies.

(Off microphone)

>> I think we can all share and particularly as a business community for business also can learn from the experiences and all the work and the infrastructure in terms of as we look six months is the average. So I think you are recognizing. That is one thing. The second thing is the workshop for IGF, we are benefiting from this shared session.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Any other questions? So we now move to the situation in different countries. I'll ask Nica to introduce herself and tell us about Philippines.

NICA DUMLAO: So hello. I'm Nica Dumlao. It will just be I'll just be talking about so we can move on and exchange what also the threats. We only have Philippines and Thailand. It would be interesting to know more about the countries where you are from.

So just a snapshot of the Philippines and it's increasing. And the Internet is also increasing. But if we see here, just like any other in Southeast Asia, it's more than -- it's more than the population. The users are more than the population. So we have 190.3 million users and 5 million people.

I think any other country --
(No audio)

NICA DUMLAO: So expression is actually -- freedom of expression is also reflected in our constitution in the bill rights. It's also reflected in the Philippine Bill of Rights. It was passed in 2012. Everyone really protested against it: It actually listed threats and these are threats that get you to jail. So cybersex -- there is also (?) we don't really have -- if the police are investigators decide that it should be (?)

So that was in the 2012. But of course the citizens -- I think it was the start of so as you can see here, the Filipinos protested and so we filed petitions. It was actually -- the most highly questioned bill in the Philippines. It was saying 15 petitioners filed petitions before Supreme Court.

A series of protests actions happened, doing the arguments. So in February in 2014, the Supreme Court actually decided -- some of the traditions that were questioned was taken down or was struck down. So the take down websites was strike down, because they decide it is unconstitutional. But the criminalization of cyber libel is still there in all of Asia. Human rights, they encourage funded Southeast Asia, a program in Southeast Asia, to adopt local or domestic versions of the Budapest Convention. So there were arguments the government said the computer system is just another means of publication. Since libel -- they should also decriminalizing it online. It made sense. The criminalization of libel was actually a case that was filed before the human rights counsel and the government lost in that case. So there's already an issue in some sessions of the government to decriminalize libel. It's not been consistent.

And cybersex or criminalization of the network: This is -- the willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation or directly or indirectly of any lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system for favor or consideration. This is included in the cybercrime prevention in 2012.

The problem here is really what are the elements of cybersex; right? So there are so many terms that was included in the law that we think it is really unconstitutional. The constitution actually upholds the equal rights of women and women's rights. So the problem here is that when you criminalize cybersex, it criminalizing the woman. It's not the law that can do that. If the government is going after those who are operating cybersex and those who are going after sexual abuse online, then that's not their role, but the government said or the Supreme Court said that it has a right to control what is lascivious or not. And it has the right to regulate what people see online? That's why it was still -- it is still there. It was not scrapped.

So what am I saying? The problem here is that when the courts or when government decides that -- or, say, decides this is your right or this is our right, as I said earlier, the domestic version of it, as we said, that's always been the case in Asia-Pacific in general. Of course, in the Philippines as well, even though we're seeing that the government is actually doing -- the government is really aggressive in doing reforms. Then it should be due to what they're pronouncing and not focus on criminalizing something and channeling that power of the Internet to expand that space; so there are measures it to stop doing the active measures.

>> MODERATOR: Thank you. Thank you, Nica.
(Applause)
>> MODERATOR: So we'll go -- okay. Too many wires.
>> PIRONGRONG RAMASOOTA: My presentation would be focused on what is happening after 2014, Thailand is now ruling by a different party, and after the coup, in our country, especially the violation on freedom of expression. Okay. So before the coup what is happening is we have, like, a political turmoil that start in November when the government party try to pass and then people not support.

Opposition party start to come out on the street and demand to revoke. Later on it is changing from -- government start to come on the street and that led to the coup. The general decide to make a coup and claiming we have to stop this political turmoil.

So after the coup, then the government -- the government pass the issue of the order and the announcement, which is equal to the law. The gathering for political purpose is banned, and calling the leader or activist to come to report. Anytime when they came to report, their gadget or mobile phone or tablet was
confiscated. The military under the martial law who asked -- so yeah. So this is the political turmoil that happened and then later on they declare martial law and two days later the coup.

And after the coup, if you are gathering for political purpose, you can go away for up to one year. In, like, national security, and also if you are someone in your country, you can be detained for two years. And the freedom of expression, our country is a kingdom, so they would punish anyone who offends the King. And also they used to punish anyone to provoke the police and also the political crown law. While the person that committed the crime say that he to defend against the King or to promote or disturb peace, then you can be sentenced up to five year.

So you may wonder what all this -- okay. Just for clarity, there were at least 124 -- so political activists and 46 were tried in the civilian court. You can see the different amounts. So and so as the Internet is growing, the freedom of expression itself, so currently we have at least 47 persons prosecuted and then 37 person in that number was executed because they put something on Facebook, or messages -- on cyber media so other people know it's considered as a crime.

Military was asked for my phone and then they have access to your devices if you write any illegal content. Also, don't worry, and then I was arrested. Even actually not on my phone, but they confiscate my wife's. This was incident that happened, 14 student were to prepare against the coup. They were arrested. They were taken to almost midnight and (?) after they finish their proceeding, the police asked him because the student wait in the car. They decide to deny, because at that time no warrant, so they have the right to access. But the police decide to not believe. So all you have to say is that the police have a warrant. That's something that just happened.

Sometime you have something in private place and you say something naughty, that's no more for human being. But what happened is the behavior is online, as I mentioned they can also see what are you talking. And then what are the conversations private and they also prosecute. So that is -- as they record at least one person, they send some picture in the private message. Another person was charged because she had -- so the criminal in Thailand, the wife of those arrested, like position, they arrest the rest of one women. This woman was a witness and it was a message that she was on that group. She was arrested, might not be.

Also, like stuff happen offline. They were performing in they call "The Wolf's Bride." Some people watch the videotape and they say it should report to the police. So they gathering and then they watch the video put together and they download,
and this from the audience. At the end decide to send 30 different police stations in the same day. This happened in 2013, but after the coup. One is the actor and the other is organization team arrested and charged and now detained.

There is also a case where the political activist is the Red Shirt Activist. He give a speech in 2010 and speech was record and then put on YouTube. Afterward he was charged. Civillian can be tried in the military court. It just happen in May 2013. So anyone who commit crime after May 2014 will be prosecuted in military court. This was actually in 2010, but because speech was record and posted on the Internet after May 2014. So the military say this is an ongoing crime. So even if it is accessible, we can try him in a military court.

This is not like Internet thing, but it's still on the technology. One taxi driver drove his passenger to the destination, and during the way, in 2014, the political separation in Thailand is like steam up. So they talk about politics. It seems like the taxi driver told something about political that passenger took offense. So she used her Smartphone, make a recording, and then report to the police. In January, the taxi driver was arrested and prosecuted after the coup.

Many use Facebook to express their opinion. The guy in the red shirt was a prominent historian in Thailand. He usually post a comment on politics and sometimes on his personal Facebook. Right after the coup, he was going to be -- he was afraid that he might be tried, so he decide to leave the country.

Another picture in the black, he was outspoken on Facebook as well. He usually talk religion or sometimes on politics or sometimes criticize. So in the middle of the night there were three men send to his residence, talk to him, politely, say you should stop commenting on. It happened just before I came here.

This man was a political activist. He used the civil acts when he was in Thailand. Right after the coup he was somebody in the military. He refused and he hide. Catch me if you can. He post on Twitter and Facebook and then finally the military and the national security track him. Otherwise finally he was caught and he was arrested.

The position because when he decide to -- people come on the street to protest and he post a message on Facebook say that if anyone only protest, you can go to this place or this place. So the military consider that treason; so he was charged. Right now the state comes after you. In Thailand is different because some of the federal citizens have different political is like which hunting. So picture you can see there was a group. They were scouting on Facebook and any other website to see if anyone
posts something and then they would. So this is what's happening. The guy who is a leader of the group come. This is what happened in Thailand on freedom of expression.

Thank you.

(Appause)

>> MODERATOR: Thank you. The last speaker, from India. Then we'll open up the forum and we have several questions.

>> BISHAKHA DATTA: Thanks. Okay. So I normally talk when I talk about freedom of expression, I normally tend to talk about gender and sexuality, examples like that. But I'm actually going to switch a little bit today and talk about freedom of expression in the context of religion in India. I had gone to a session on online hate speech. There are murders, etc., and so it's a very dramatic and extreme.

India is not exempt and we have solutions, too. I think because it was so dramatic and stark in the neighboring countries, when I was leaving somebody said that was great you to do up. So my intention was not to provide come I can relief. Actually, in this situation, again, the second thing is when we were at the excellent freedom of expression in the context of religion or content organized by the partners, I'm going to talk about them in the context.

I think most of the people in this room do know that India, like China, has a population of over a billion. The majority is 85 to 90% is Hindu. There are other religious minorities, the largest of which is Muslims living in India. One of the interesting things, just two or three points where we have background, one is that from three independent times, we became independent in 1947, but pre-independent there was a right-wing religious group which is called the RSS, which expired. We now have a new government. We now have a new political party, the political arm of this religious school.

That's how politics enter and often go hands in hands in countries like ours. The political party stays as the religious wing. Now I want to go into some of the things that happened in India since then in terms of freedom of expression, all of which relate to the Internet. So one of the first things that we are seeing, and there was a case even day before yesterday, but this is something that happened routinely. There is a large Hindu right-wing presence on Twitter, particularly, and also social media, which functions as a cyber-army, of sorts. I cannot prove it at this moment, but we know there is part of it which is paid and part of it is volunteer. But if there is any criticism of the Hindu right or any question, there is a tendency to go after individuals by the time a moderate people.

Day before yesterday, a well-known left-wing actually challenged (?) saying there are so many serious women's rights
issues, set up your symptoms and post it online. This orchestrated, synchronized attack on Twitter, which then resulted in Tweets saying, hey, what is it woman's address? Somebody, give it to me, please.

So the reason you're saying oops is because we know the direction in which this is headed. This is going to be a case going to take out her private information. Then you're going to use it as a way to threaten and silence her; right?

So whether you do anything or not is not the question. The question is at the level of the threat, it is extremely effective and this is one of the things that's happening.

The second kind of thing that's happening is really religion again. This month itself we had the solution where on objection content around religion, very popular in India. The person had it on his phone and then apologized after 15 minutes. Again, it became sort of a near-riot-like situation. Because again, there was a lot of talk about it's not -- this apology is not enough. This person has to be arrested and brought into jail, etc., etc.

For him, look at the sort of impacts in terms of freedom expression. And I think one of the -- it becomes a very, very slippery slope that then opens the door to essentially the party of the government asking for bans on content. That's another complicated thing. We have seen a case like this. Actually, the most famous incident took place on Facebook two or three years ago. A right-wing politician, so basically a very prominent person, passed away and a friend put a like on it, and they were both then arrested by the police. When they asked why does the whole city have to shut down? Under Act 66 (a) has now been overwritten/repealed by the Supreme Court this year in March. Politicians are very, very quick to use the law in this kind of way, etc. But it's basically I'm just giving you a few episodes anecdotes.

We have old India, which is also going to be -- because in India we have different legal systems, depending on what person you belong to. The understanding is that the person is now going to turn to social media, both to sort of campaign against what it sees this larger sort of emphasis of the new culture, which is true. We have recently seen things we have never seen, because the Band-Aid won't stick. It's not coming from an animal rights protection philosophy at all. It's coming from the cow is considered sacred in Hinduism and let us reinforce, that kind of people etc., etc.

So he just want to point out and say in the last example that I want to give you, which really affects, actually, Civil Society human rights defenders and nonprofit groups. We have a foreign family. That is the -- this is the last comments as I
go back one of the things they want us to put in the new amendments is you have to share your Twitter and your Facebook handle. Every time you get an international grant, not a local grant, it's a transparency mechanism, you should say it doesn't matter if they went from an international course to a domestic course.

In this case, it's very clear if you're going to, you have to make it public within two days on the website and list after the all the partners, etc., etc., say why you're doing it. We're not opposed to transparency in the least, and also give your Twitter and your Facebook handle.

So this makes us now feel that we are now going to be a right in government to a social media. Yeah, the same sort of thing. So that he is basically I wanted to point out and see that also offline we are seeing, for instance, the government has got something. If you see it as one off, it seems like how could he got that back? But then as you see it for in the Hindu culture, this is one part of the plan and then you begin to see sort of some of the issues that are at stake for us in India.

>> MODERATOR: Thank you very much, Bishakha.

(Applause)

>> MODERATOR: I'm very glad that you mentioned the foreign country. So we talked about government, commercial software. We talked about the text in the field. I didn't know about it -- yeah. Actually, it's the citizens against citizens. We talked about religious freedom issues as well and we talked about cybercrime law. So this is unprecedented. The different governments are now bringing and going over the cybercrime laws. I will tell you if Pakistan -- it's a bit unknown with the cybercrime law, but the new law, it actually did do better in the last movement. You cannot hear -- if you want to work, it you want to work on the issues, you have to be a gongle, or you cannot function.

Is there any online questions? Any questions from the audience?

>> AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's actually not a question. This is on freedom expression, but with the religious freedom. When you're talking about them, they were being silenced for speaking up. Whether it's sufficient, the changing in the political and international situation with the coming up world terror. Things have been shifted. In addition, the governments are getting mostly radical. Just censor them walking, for example. So then the very same people who are -- who have been speaking up and getting censorship, are actually supporting that from the government and it's the same. If the government and don't you think you should and the government in the groups? I think this really poses a challenge for us in Indonesia.
There are countries that are doing a better job in terms of the (?) technology companies updating the tools safety. When you were talking about Pakistan, there is this event as it happened. In San Francisco, one thing that was consistent is if you can bring the technology -- both state and nonstate, if you can produce some kind of environment where you can just -- I just think if you can rally and sort of decree and take some learnings in this community organizing and maybe something we can do in the conversation in this region is in country after country. It's happening in all the countries. If we can address those and get to the community.

>> MODERATOR: There is an announcement. There is a bus going to leave from the university back to Holiday Inn will be leaving at 6:40 and not 6:10.

There are two comments, and I want -- if you want to mention we are talking about nonstate actors and how they track activists. So and Bishakha was saying, you can start with --

>> Okay. The nonstate actors. The conversation we were having before about the nonstate actors is I think the conversation tends to be about the companies and about the government. And then I think one thing that gets left out is essentially -- right, the less regulated actors are often nonstate actors. One of the conversations that I've had a few times with people is what's the point of using the security stuff? You can't access it anyway.

It's not necessarily -- I think a lot of the harassment that we have seen from the nonstate actors, you don't actually need much sophistication to do low-level harassment on Facebook or access passwords or do various social hacking and things like that. At minimal levels, security can actually be quite useful in protecting against. I think that's one of the cultural shifts that we have been trying to work on.

>> BISHAKHA DATTA: Just facing the exactly same things in the women's rights movement. Recently we had a documentary in India for the BBC called India's Doctor, about a gang rape case in India. She got access to one of the rapists in prison. Obviously his views were totally and you're shocked at the reasoning. But one of the things demanded from the women's right movement was to ban the documentary, which is very problematic. Just because you disagree with something doesn't mean it should be banned.

Unfortunately, many of the social movements have the understanding of freedom of speech, but push the conversation forward a little bit. I'm just wondering whether some of the stuff in what you were saying, Shahzad, when we think through the lens of speech and through sort of the standards that Frank Laru had -- if you can be sure -- then how do we think about it?
I. Used to have a much more absolutist view of free speech and I used to be a free speech Nazi type of person, but have moved a little bit to after really seeing taking care to distinguish between harm and offense. And now my position is that if it's harm, we might really need to seriously think about doing something about it.

>> MODERATOR: Thank you. Thank you.
(Off microphone)

>> MODERATOR: The recent developments that were happening in the U.S., a lot of people on Facebook, they were changing their profile pictures. So there is now a campaign against a newspaper. So that was a hashtag describing it. There were people who fought against and this younger who wrote about it and published it in the Tribune. There is a different trend, but they can create noise, I would say.

It's becoming life threatening, not only for the people who work in that newspaper, but problematic is that these people are now building posts or whatever somebody written about it or supported about it and posting pictures online. A lot of them are young women and how they are being targeted and possibly boys are being targeted.

So this whole intolerance in the discussion and then in the debate, this is what nonstate actors also mean. Not necessarily people from the government, their lies can cost someone's life. This is, unfortunately, is the story of our larger region from hacking to Bangladesh, and in Pakistan, in Maldives, and it is very funny, but it is costing people a lot of their professional -- their integrity, their life. One of the activists in Geneva, there was a young person and he was almost sure that he is going to be behind bars for quite a few years.

So this is, unfortunately, happening. So a round of applause for our panelists, please. On behalf of the citizens of EngageMedia, I want to thank you all for joining this panel. You were very generous in sharing. Thank you very much. You were a great audience. Thanks a lot.

(Applause)

>> There is going to be the outcomes document drafting in the large hall. So we encourage information. We really want to have this going experiment for this from APrIGF. Also, the announcement earlier about the shuttle bus will be announced at the outcome documents session and will be updated on the website. Thank you.

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